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Delony: Good Faith in Collective Bargaining

GOOD FAITH IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
DEXTER DELONY*

There are types of concerted activities, such as the sit-down strike,
that are neither protected by the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended,' nor made illegal by the act. 2 The question of what union
tactics fall within the area of activities protected by the act, such
as strikes, is quite different from the question of what tactics are
illegal for the reason that they run counter to requirements of the
act, good faith, for instance. Under the act union activities may be
classified into three groups:
(1) Protected activities, such as the strike. Any employee who
engages in these activities is insulated to a degree from
economic pressure by the employer.
(2) Unprotected activities that are not prohibited by the act,
neither encouraged nor discouraged. These activities
can be opposed by the employer by economic pressure and
perhaps, as in the case of violence, by a proceeding under
3
state law though not under the act.
(3) Activities specifically prohibited, such as the jurisdictional strike and certain types of secondary boycotts, or
those that violate the good faith concept prescribed by the
act.
Freedom from interference by law is an essential ingredient of in*B.S. 1936, LL.B. 1939, University of Alabama; LL.M. 1941, Harvard University;
Professor of Law, University of Florida; Member of National Panel of American
Arbitration Association; Former Attorney with the National Labor Relations Board.
161 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158 (1958).

2Unless the objective of the activity is illegal under the act or unless the
activity falls within the scope of the good faith concept. See Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1938), aff'd, 306 U.S. 240 (1939); B. V. D.
Co. and International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 110 N.L.R.B. 1412 (1954),
order set aside in part, 237 F.2d 545 (1956); Mid-Continent Pet. Corp., 54 N.L.R.B.

912 (1944); Weisiger, Reinstatement of Sit-down Strikers, 23 MINN. L. REV. 30
(1938); Note, 31 ILL. L. REv. 942 (1937). But a sit-down strike may not excuse
an employer from his duty to bargain. Universal Film Exchange, Inc., 13 N.L.R.B.
484 (1939).
3If the objective of the violence is illegal under the act it may be an unfair
labor practice. See §8 (b) of the act. Perhaps also it may be bad faith, if in a
bargaining context.

See NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464

(1953); notes

113, 114, 119 infra and accompanying text.

[3781

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

1

FloridaGOOD
Law Review,
Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1959], Art. 3
FAITH
dustrial self-government, one of the basic values sought to be preserved by the act. This freedom is infringed in the first and third
areas outlined above. The purpose of this article is to examine the
infringement made by the good faith concept of the third area and
the impact of this concept on the basic value of industrial selfgovernment.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

As

AN INSTITUTION OF

INDUSTRIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

Labor policy has two basic objectives, industrial peace and industrial self-government. The trick is to accomplish both objectives,
which in many respects are opposed to each other. Complete industrial freedom probably could be bought at the expense of considerable industrial warfare and chaos, and complete industrial peace
probably could be achieved only by the sacrifice of vital freedoms of
the people. For instance, industrial peace may be obtained by domination of labor by management or domination of management by
labor, so that one side is too weak to fight for any right or perhaps
even object to its enslavement, or by complete determination of industrial issues by law force through government tribunals, such as
wage courts. Congress has refused to permit the imposition of either
price tag and has attempted to achieve both objectives, to a degree,
through the institution of collective bargaining. Probably there is
no alternative to collective bargaining other than domination of one
side by the other or determination of issues by law force.
Collective bargaining tends to achieve industrial peace by affording the means for the development of mature representatives of management and labor who are capable of understanding the industrial
issues and by enabling the representatives of both sides to understand
the issues and appreciate the different points of view. In addition,
the opinion is rather widely held that often collective bargaining
tends to give to the parties a fair share of the industrial values produced, resulting in more contented employees and hence better production and fewer work stoppages. Industrial peace is further achieved
by making law force available, through the unfair labor practice
concept, as a means of bringing about the structure essential to collective bargaining - the creation and recognition of bargaining representatives. Obviously to this extent the area of industrial self-government has been narrowed by law for two objectives - to reduce the
area of industrial conflict and to provide the structure essential for
collective bargaining.
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Broadly speaking, industrial issues fall into two classifications: (1)
those pertaining to the creation and recognition of the collective
bargaining structure, and (2) those pertaining to the terms and conditions of employment. Problems in the first group, such as recognition, are not bargainable issues; they involve law enforced rights,
and a position cannot be taken on them by one party for the purpose
of influencing the other on bargainable issues. 4 Industrial self-government is achieved by allotting the second group of issues to the parties
themselves for determination without law force through collective
bargaining. It may be said, then, that there are four issue-determining
tribunals: the National Labor Relations Board, with appeal to the
courts, both of which resolve by use of law force the issues in the
first group, and collective bargaining, with voluntary arbitration,
both of which resolve without law force the issues in the second group.
There are elements of self-government in the determination of the
first group of issues in that the law provides for selection of the
representatives by the parties without eliminating the self-help method
of determining many of the issues. There are elements of law force
in the determination of the second group of issues in that the law
prescribes in broad outline the method of determination, actually
determines some issues, such as matters pertaining to safety and
sanitation, and narrows the range of the determination of other
issues by the parties, such as prescribing minimum wages and maximum hours. Nevertheless, by far most of the issues in the second
group, including the major ones, are determined by the parties
through collective bargaining; and, under present labor policy, law
force should not and must not be used to resolve them. 5 As to noncompulsory bargaining subjects and subjects not covered by the act,
the parties have considerable self-government in that they are relatively free from law force. The exception is the illegality of a position
that is considered unreasonable in relation to an issue in one of the
above classifications.
Good faith is an integral part of collective bargaining. So are the
strike and certain other types of pressure, such as picketing. The
strike or the threat of strike is the force that motivates agreement.
Both labor and management fear it. It penalizes both sides. Without
it, why would either side care to agree with the other? Without it
4Simplicity Pattern Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1283 (1953).
5This statement contemplates normal situations as opposed to national emergencies.
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collective bargaining will not work.6 Sometimes through exchange
of views the parties reach an agreement, but often when this cannot
be done they discover that the area of disagreement is so narrow
that it is cheaper to compromise than to engage in industrial warfare.
Good faith can no more supplant the strike in successful collective
bargaining than it can supplant force in successful government. Much
of the law of strikes involves application of the fundamental doctrine
of just cause, that is, certain ends and objectives will justify certain
means that involve intentional harm, which would constitute an
actionable tort but for the justification.7 Historically the law moved
from the position that the strike cannot be justified by the objective
of economic betterment for the worker8 to the position that such
ends justify the incidental intentional harm of the strike. 9 The justification depends on the social value of the ends. Broadly speaking,
the aim of the strike is not higher wages but industrial self-government. Although society today weighs heavily the economic betterment
of the worker, the basic justification of the strike is industrial selfgovernment through collective bargaining, the means for avoiding
the submission of the interests of labor and management to the dictation of one of the interested parties or that of government-not
just a decree of minimum wages and maximum hours but the determination and definition of particular jobs, the exact wages and
hours for that job, and perhaps a determination of what man for
what job. In appraising the strike, society must ask whether industrial self-government justifies the cost. Although the strike is
costly to management, to labor, and to society, it is far less costly
than the alternatives. Admittedly the strike is a crude means for ac6

1n Aug. 1959, newspapers widely reported a great increase in unresolved labormanagement disputes in British Columbia resulting in a post-war record for the
province in work stoppages. Many offered the opinion that a major cause of a
number of the unresolved disputes is a new provincial law, the Trade Union Act,
Bill 43, passed in Mar. 1959, that, it is said, greatly curtails the effectiveness of the
strike as a motivating force behind collective bargaining.
7Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926); Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Cow and
Co., [1889] 23 Q.B. 598, aff'd, [1892] A.C. 25; Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East 574,
103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1707); see Beale, Justificationfor Injury, 41 HARv. L. Rv.
553 (1928). An obvious example of the law of ends justifying the means is when
it is necessary for a man to kill to save himself, his loved ones, or his property.
sHitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
9C. S. Smith Metropolitan Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal. 2d 389, 106 P.2d 414
(1940); Saulsberry v. Coopers' Int'l Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912);
Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63 (1932).
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complishing industrial self-government; on the other hand, complete
polish and efficiency can be achieved only by the loss of a free industrial society. But, one may ask, cannot more polish be put on the
means without sacrificing the cherished basic values of free industrial
society and self-government? Congress thought so when it set up the
concept of unfair labor practices. It felt that there should be available a polished means for obtaining some of the essentials of collective bargaining, for instance, recognition of one side by the other
and a reasonable meeting place, thereby reducing the occasions for
the use of the crude means. The unfair labor practices were designed
to draw a careful distinction between issues involving rights, such as
recognition, and issues not involving rights, such as higher wages, and
were made to apply only to the former.
There are many types of nongovernmental forces other than the
strike that support collective bargaining. Some pressures, such as
picketing under certain conditions, are just as legal and can be justified as easily as the strike in the performance of the essential functions
necessary for industrial self-government. Others, such as violence,
cannot. In some situations the line between legal and illegal pressures has never been clearly drawn. The Congress, the courts, and
the National Labor Relations Board have groped along with the
strong desire to reduce the area in which the crude supports of collective bargaining are needed and to narrow the crudeness of those
supports, but with an ever-present fear that tampering with the supports might do serious harm to the vitals of collective bargaining.
Recently the National Labor Relations Board and the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had a very important
difference of opinion regarding the meaning of Congress with reference to the legality of certain other pressures under the good faith
concept.' 0
Government regulation of collective bargaining has proceeded
along two lines: One, the substantive aspects of collective bargaining,
that is, identification of the issues about which the parties must
bargain; and, Two, the collective bargaining process, that is, requirements pertaining to the conduct and attitude of the parties,
namely, good faith. Item One is important in that it imposes the
loTextile Workers Union, CIO, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954), enforced in part, set
aside in part, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, AFLCIO, 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957), enforcement denied, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
discussed infra pp. 405-12.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1959], Art. 3
GOOD FAITH
principle of joint determination of terms and conditions of employment, sometimes expressed as the forced recognition of and bargaining with representatives of employees of an appropriate unit selected
by a majority of the employees of the unit. The self-government still
left to the parties is their right to determine jointly the terms of the
solution of the issues about which they must bargain, including an
honest failure to reach agreement, and their right to determine jointly
or unilaterally the terms of the solution of the industrial issues not
answered by the act or covered by compulsory bargaining. Item Two
is very significant for two reasons: (1) its objective of bringing about
good bargaining practices in order better to insure the successful
operation of the system, and (2) its effect of bringing to the bargaining table law force of a type that, intentionally or unintentionally,
may tend to influence the decision on issues and thereby, to a dangerous degree, destroy self-government.
Free collective bargaining would permit either labor or management to say to the other: "I'll meet you at the bargaining table only
if you are strong enough to make me"; and, once there, "I'll talk with
you and bargain with you, make proposals and counterproposals, only
if you are strong enough to make me"; and, further, while bargaining,
"I'll effect a good attitude and exercise good conduct only if you
are strong enough to make me." Government has made law force
available so that through it the weaker party can compel the stronger
in each of the above instances.
THE GOOD FAITH CONCEPT
A good faith concept is found in many areas of the law; for instance, in the bona fide purchaser and the holder in due course doctrines of the law of chattels and the law of negotiable instruments.
It has had a long and varied history; sometimes it has been used to
outlaw conduct per se, irrespective of the state of mind,:" but usually
it has been used to reach conduct that flows from particular mental
attitudes and intentions.12 The key is the state of the mind, as, for
instance, in the pure heart but empty head idea of good faith in the
holder in due course doctrine." Standards of good faith and proof
liGill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (1824); see Radio Officers
Union, AFL v. NLRB, 547 U.S. 17, 45 (1954); Pacific Intermountain Express Co.,
107 N.L.R.B. 837, 845 (1954).
2Lawson v. Weston, 4 Esp. 56, 170 Eng. Rep. 640 (1801).
13UNIFORM Nwaonm~st INSTRUMENTS LAW §56; Graham v. White-Phillips Co.,
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of good faith have given rise to serious problems in all areas in which
the concept has been applied, but the law has never considered the
concept as impossible to apply, or even unfeasible, and has utilized
1
it to achieve worth-while and useful objectives. 4
The Wagner Act

5

The good faith term does not appear in the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, but the National Labor Relations Board
quickly imposed the concept in its interpretation and application of
section 8 (5), which provided that it was an unfair labor practice for
an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative
of his employees. So, until the Taft-Hartley Act, 16 the concept was
created for and exclusively applied to the attitude and the conduct
of the employer in the collective bargaining process.
Since the concept was implied from the duty to bargain imposed
by section 8 (5), it is helpful to break the duty, as defined by the
Board and the courts, into its two component parts. First, the duty
to bargain presupposes representatives free from the influence and
domination of the opposite party in the bargaining process. 17 For
instance, if the agent of labor is under the control of the employer
the result is something comparable to the employer bargaining with
himself. Here the Board uses objective standards, and professes to
be concerned primarily with conduct per se. In the case of a threat
by an employer to an employee, it is the threat that is outlawed, irrespective of the employer's intent or of whether the threat in fact
affects the employees' choice of representative.' 8 However, subjective
296 U.S. 27 (1935).
14S. L. Allen & Co., I N.L.R.B. 714, 727 (1936).
See "Good Faith," 18A
WORDS AND PHRASES 83 (1956); "Acting in Good Faith," 2 WORDS AND PHRASES 19
(1955); "Bad Faith," 5 WoRDs AND PHRASES 6 (1940); "Conscience," 8A WoRDs
AND PHRASES 179 (1951).
"sThe National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§158 (5) (1958). See S. L. Allen & Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 714, 727 (1936), for one of the
first interpretations of §8 (5) and its good faith implications.
16The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29
U.S.C. §141 (1958).
"7See National Labor Relations Act §8, supra note 15. It may be bad faith
for an employer to refuse to insert in an agreement a clause agreeing not- to
discriminate because of union membership. Montgomery Ward & Co., 37 N.L.R.B.
100 (1941), enforced, 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).
isSee Killingsworth, Employer Freedom of Speech and the NLRB, 1941 Wis.
L. REv. 211.
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standards are indulged in for the purpose of determining the conduct
that normally influences employees in their decisions., 9 In addition to
these ways of rendering a bargaining agent inadequate, unions may
in some instances, in fact although perhaps not in law, lose their
ability to give appropriate representation to labor because of their
interest in the corporate employer through large stock holdings.
Second, the employer must recognize the union designated by a majority of the employees of the appropriate bargaining unit as the
exclusive representative of labor in that unit regarding wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment. This may be called the heart
of the duty to bargain; it means the acceptance of the union as a
joint participant in the establishment of working conditions. Objective standards are used; for instance, no one but the chosen representatives may be dealt with. In addition, subjective standards are used;
for instance, one must adopt a mental attitude that permits genuine
recognition of the union as a joint participant.2O It is bad faith for
the employer to insist to the point of impasse that he be given unilateral control over one or more of the compulsory bargaining subjects. 2' Failure to give genuine recognition to the union as a joint
participant may be bad faith or simply a refusal to bargain.22 The
goal of the law is the objective conduct that flows from subjective
genuine recognition.
Three parts may be distilled from the second item above. First,
the employer must meet with the representative of labor at a reasonable time and place. Failure to do so is evidence of a mental attitude
opposed to recognizing labor as a joint participant and to arriving at
an agreement. Failure to do so may be bad faith or simply a refusal
to bargain. 23 The law aims at subjective genuine recognition that
automatically results in the objective of reasonable time and place
'DSee NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
2ONLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943).
2'NLRB v. Blair Quarries, 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1945); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
22NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra note 20. It is bad faith to refuse to
insert in an agreement a clause that specifically recognizes the union. McQuayNorris Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 565
(1941). It is bad faith for an employer to require employees to sign an agreement
in some name other than the union name. NLRB v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d
713 (3d Cir. 1939).
23NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512 (1942), reversing 117 F.2d 921 (6th
Cir. 1941); Montgomery Ward & Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 229 (1942); Fein's Tin Can Co.,
23 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1940).
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of meeting. Second, the employer must have a sincere desire to reach
an agreement with labor about terms and conditions of employment.
Genuine recognition of labor as a joint participant tends to bring
about the mental attitude of sincere desire for agreement, but the
Board decisions do not stop there. This is the area in which decisions
imply or create the good faith concept in order to compel by law force
the mental attitude of sincere desire to reach agreement.24 This concept requires proposals and counterproposals and otherwise permits
the Board to control conduct during negotiations.2 5 The problem here
is standards. What standard of objective conduct will determine or
measure the required subjective attitude? Third, the employer must
sign, or request, a writing that embodies the agreement with labor.
Signing an agreement already reached would flow naturally from
the legally imposed attitude, that is, genuine recognition of labor as
a joint participant in determining conditions of employment and
sincere desire to reach a genuine agreement that will control the
conditions. Refusal to sign the written terms agreed to may evidence
bad faith or simply a refusal to bargain.26
At the San Francisco meeting with labor leaders on September
20, 1959, Premier Khrushchev is reported to have referred to the
1956 Hungarian revolutionaries as "hooligans." One is inclined to
ask what is that, just as one is inclined to ask what is good faith
in labor bargaining. Standards are necessary to give meaning to
words or terms. Negligence has its prudent man; negotiable paper
has its pure heart but empty head; malpractice has its standard of
usual or customary procedures. In medical practice the subjective
standard is the desire, perhaps the intent or will, to cure the patient.
From this flows the objective standard of customary procedures. Did
the physician do a cardiogram? Did the dentist make a root canal?
In unemployment compensation, the standard that determines the
applicant's eligibility is objective conduct consistent with the subjective genuine desire to work and be self-supporting. The good faith
24NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 96 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1938), afJ'd, 306 U.S. 332
(1939); Newark Rivet Works, 9 N.L.R.B. 498 (1938); S. L. Allen & Co., I N.L.R.B.
714, 727 (1936); see NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra note 20.
25American Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 629 (1940); NLRB v. Lund, 103
F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1939); J. I. Case Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1145 (1946).
26H- J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941); NLRB v. American Creosoting

Co., 139 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1943), cert denied, 321 U.S. 797 (1944). See National
Labor Relations Act §8 (d), as amended, 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(d)
(1958).
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bargaining cases under the Wagner Act seem to reveal one standard
consistently applied, namely, the objective conduct in the bargaining
process that naturally flows from the subjective genuine recognition
of labor as a joint participant and the desire to reach agreement with
labor on terms that control working conditions. The external standard measures the subjective requisite. Notice the following examples.
The Board early insisted on reasoned discussion, no take-it-or-leaveit attitude but one indicating "an open and fair mind, and a sincere
purpose to find a basis of agreement .. . ."27 The employer should
discuss fully an issue raised,28 but if an impasse is reached he cannot
refuse to discuss other issues or insist that the union give up one of
its demands as a condition to moving on to other issues.29 The employer must discuss specifically each of the union's proposals, state
his position on each proposal clearly, and give reasons for adopting
the position. 30 When a demand is rejected he must give a full explanation with supporting data. 3' Bad faith may be evidenced by
tone of voice, expression, and manner, such as a peremptory and
nonconcilatory manner,3 2 as well as remarks that the employees can
accept his proposal or quit, or that there is no reason for negotiations, 33
or that the union representative is stupid or a thief,34 or that the employer's representative is present only because the law forces his
attendance, 35 or that the act imposes no duty to agree.3 6 The employer must avoid delaying tactics, such as long, immaterial, and
devious arguments on union demands, and discussion of unrelated
and trivial matters. 37 He may reveal bad faith by failure to make an
27Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939).
2sPurity Biscuit Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 917 (1939).
29Pool Mfg. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 540 (1946); Winona Textile Mills, Inc., 68
N.L.R.B. 702 (1946), enforced, 160 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1647).
3OHeisler Mfg. Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1114 (1946); Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444
(1940), enforced as modified, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595

(1941).
3lBethelem Shipbuilding Corp., 11 N.L.R.B. 105 (1939), enforced as modified,
114 F.2d 930 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 710 (1941).
3
2Pioneer Pearl Button Co., I N.L.R.B. 837 (1936).
33Louisville Refining Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 844 (1938), enforced as modified, 102
F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1939).
34Ibid.
35Armour & Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 1412 (1943).
36Chambers Corp., 21 N.L.R.B. 808 (1940).
3
71nterstate S.S. Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 1307 (1941); Stonewall Cotton Mills, 36
N.L.R.B. 240 (1941), enforced as modified, 129 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 667 (1942); Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444 (1940), enforced, 119 F.2d
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effort to arrange later meetings,38 to make a telephone call as
promised,

9

to answer a material letter without explanation,'

to keep an appointment without reasonable

cause. 41

or

The em-

ployer must take an active part in seeking a basis for agreement; this
often has been held to require the submission of counterproposals,
in writing if requested. 42 And in certain situations as each clause is
43
agreed to he may be required to put it in writing and to initial it.
The employer must not submit specific proposals that he insists are
unalterable 4 4 but must at least remain flexible regarding phrase45
ology.
An examination of the Wagner Act good faith cases reveals that
two things are common to all of them. First, the subjective test was
used; based on the employer's conduct, a finding was made as to his
attitude and motive. No attempt was made to impose the objective
standard of the prudent man or the "ought" conduct, with the possible
exception of the time and place of meeting and the signing of the
agreement. Second, the findings of bad faith were made in a context
of employer refusal to recognize labor or its representative as a joint
participant in the determination of conditions of employment, and
good faith was used as a device to force the recognition, an essential
to successful collective bargaining. 46 It seems reasonably clear in all of
the cases that the objective of the Board was to gain recognition for
labor rather than to influence the terms of agreement. This is what
was intended by the members of Congress who had most to do with
the enactment of the Wagner Act.4 7 Certainly this position is most
defensible. There is no right in law to a condition of employment,
for example, higher wages; but there is a right in law to recognition
131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
38Newark Rivet Works, 9 N.L.R.B. 498 (1938).
39Ibid.
4oJoseph R. Gregory, 31 N.L.R.B. 71 (1941).
41Martin Bros. Box Co., 35 N.L.R.B. 217 (1941), enforced, 130 F.2d 202 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 660 (1942).
42NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943); H. G. Hill
Stores, Inc., 49 N.L.R.B. 184 (1943), enforced, 140 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1944); NLRB
v. George P. Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941); Woodside Cotton Mills
Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 42 (1940).
43Union Mfg. Co., 27 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1940).
44Armour & Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 1412 (1943).
45Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 35 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1941), enforced as modified, 145 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1944).
46Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
4"See 79 CoNG. REc. 7571 (1935).
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by the employer of the representative of labor. Consequently, there
is justification for the removal of the recognition issue from the arena
of economic warfare, which would avoid the waste of force by strike,
or at least tend to do so by affording a legal remedy to enforce the
right. In view of the Board's objective and the context of the cases,
probably the good faith cases, through the 1940's, have done no
serious harm to the policy of industrial self-government.
Although the subjective test of genuine desire for agreement is
usually applied throughout the Wagner Act decisions on the duty-tobargain question, there arises from the cases a good indication that
the Board is approaching the position of imposing some objective
conduct during bargaining without the need of finding subjective
employer desire or attitude or motive. Probably the Board has done
so in at least two respects: (I) the employer must meet with labor
at a reasonable time and place, the objective being an understanding
by the parties concerned of the positions of each, with the hope that
they will agree; 48 (2) the employer must sign a writing that embodies
an agreement already made. The point is that a signed agreement
is more likely to achieve the desired objective of control of working
conditions than an unsigned one. 49 The new thing possibly developing here is law-imposed objective elements of the collective bargaining
procedure, separate and apart from the subjective good faith concept.
Again, however, probably these decisions have done no harm to selfgovernment. These objective elements of the collective bargaining
procedure are not different in kind from the unquestioned duty to
meet, and they do not tend to influence the terms of agreement. The
danger arises from the use of these cases as precedent to establish a
rigid collective bargaining process made up of many objective elements
and, from the use of the good faith cases, including their general
language on standards, outside the recognition context as precedents
to give the Board influence or control over bargaining positions
taken by the parties. Both of these developments will result in the
use of law force to influence the terms of the agreement on working
conditions.
The Taft-Hartley Act5o
By passing the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress accepted the good
4sSee notes 23 supra,50 infra.
49See notes 26 supra,50 infra.
5oSec. 8 (5) of the Wagner Act, note 15 supra, is included without change in
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faith concept previously imposed under the Wagner Act
and expressly required that it be continued and applied to
unions as well as employers. 51 Although in an effort to safeguard free
speech the amended act compelled the Board to refuse to accept uncoercive expressions as evidence of unfair labor practice,5 2 aside from
this limitation Congress seems to have accepted the sincere desire-toreach-agreement standard of good faith, and the Board has continued
to use the standard in imposing good faith on the employer 3 and on
the union.59
Soon after the 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act the Board recognized that section 8 (b) (3) of the act, as
amended, 5 imposed upon unions a duty to bargain co-extensive with
the duty long since imposed upon employers by section 8 (a) (5) of
the Taft-Hartley Act as §8 (a) (5), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158 (a) (5) (1958).
The Taft-Hartley Act added §8(b)(3), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(3)
(1958), which makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to refuse to bargain
collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees
subject to the provisions of section 9 (a)." Compare this language with that of
§8 (5) of the Wagner Act (same as §8 (a) (5) of the Taft-Hartley Act), viz., that
it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representative of his employees, subject to the provisions of section
9 (a)." The Taft-Hartley Act gives for the first time a statutory definition of
collective bargaining, including the good faith aspect. This, among other things,
is included in §8(d), 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1958). The definition
is stated as follows: "[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession .... . Sections 8 (a)(5), 8(b)(3) and 8 (d) of the Taft-Hartley Act were not
changed by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
5
1See note 50 supra.
52See §8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 142, 29 U.S.C. §158(c) (1958).
See notes 33-36 supra.
53E. I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 84 (1956); Iron Castings,
Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 739 (1955); Marlo Offset Printing Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 841 (1955);
Bewley Mills, 111 N.L.R.B. 830 (1955); Paul Stevens, 109 N.L.R.B. 86 (1954); A. E.
Nettleton Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1670 (1954); The Andrew Jergens Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 363
(1948); see 14 NLRB ANN. RFP. 73 (1949).
54Penello v. International Union, UMW, 88 F. Supp. 935 (D.D.C. 1950); Essex
County, Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters, 95 N.L.R.B. 969 (1951); National
Maritime Union, 82 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1949).
5

5See note 50 supra.
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the act, as amended.56 The Board has indicated clearly that its decisions both before and after the 1947 amendments concerning the
employer's duty to bargain will be used as "guideposts" in determin57
ing a union's duty to bargain.
Section 8 (d) of the act, as amended,58 describes a collective bargaining procedure with three elements: (1) meeting at a reasonable
time, (2) negotiation in good faith on conditions of employment,
and (3) execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached. 59 In addition there are prescribed definite objective procedural requirements for the termination of an existing agreement.
It seems that items (1) and (3) were intended by Congress to be
objective elements of the bargaining procedure, separate and apart
from the subjective matter of good faith. There is no question that
since the Taft-Hartley Act the Board has followed the view that the
"goodness" of the motivation of the employer in refusing to meet or
to sign an agreement previously agreed to is immaterial. For instance, an employer's refusal to meet is not excused by reason of
the union's failure to comply with a state registration law,60 the
employer's obligation under a state court injunction,61 the employer's
erroneous belief that the subject proposed for bargaining is outside
the area of obligatory bargaining 62 or that the striking workers are
63
no longer his employees.
The Board recognized a structure of collective bargaining pros6Chicago Typographical Union, 86 N.L.R.B. 1041 (1949); see note 50 supra.
57National Maritime Union, CIO, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948), enforced, 175 F.2d
686 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950).
5sSee note 50 supra.
5i0bid.

6ODalton Telephone Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 1001 (1949).
6lGrace Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 435 (1949).
62General Motors Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), in which the Board said that
the identification of compulsory subjects, such as pensions, that may be contained
in the statutory phrase conditions of employment are questions of law about which
the employer acts at his peril and that good faith, good purpose, or good motive
is no excuse. Contrast this position with the subjectiveness of the application of
the good faith concept in negotiable instruments. For instance, the purchaser of
a negotiable bill, erroneously thinking that it was not stolen, fails to follow
prudent practices in making the purchase; nevertheless his knowledge, motive,
purpose, intent, desire, etc., are "good"; so he is a good faith purchaser and is
able to cut off the outstanding title. Graham v. White-Phillips Co., 296 U.S. 27
(1935), in which the purchaser was informed of the theft but forgot about it
when he purchased the bill and hence was a good faith purchaser.
63Greensboro Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 543 (1949).
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cedure. Items (1) and (3) above, the meeting and the signing, the
beginning of bargaining and its ending, together with the requirements for the termination of an existing contract, are law-imposed
objective elements of the procedure. Item (2), that which goes on
between the meeting and the signing, the beginning and the ending the negotiating- is free from law force except for the subjective good

faith concept. The Board continued to build and otherwise implement the objective elements of the bargaining structure. For instance, an employer may refuse to meet for bargaining purposes,
without any inquiry into the motive for his refusal, if the union is
guilty of "wrongful" conduct, such as striking in violation of an
existing contract 64 or engaging in a slowdown. 65 Incidentally, an
interesting point may be raised regarding what makes the contract
violation and the slowdown wrongful. Although they are not protected activities,66 neither are they prohibited by the act unless they

violate the good faith concept. The Board has taken the position
that such unprotected activities violate good faith and therefore are
subject to being prohibited; 67 however, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that a state is free to prohibit the slowdown and
that the National Labor Relations Act did not authorize the Board
to "deal with it in any manner."6s The Board has said that a refusal to meet is a violation of the act irrespective of motive and that
good faith will not excuse or prevent the violation. For example,
refusal for the time being because of economic expedience is no
excuse. 69 On the other hand, irrespective of motive, either party
may refuse to meet and negotiate even on a compulsory subject, if
the subject was either treated in an existing agreement or discussed
in the negotiations that led to the existing agreement even though
70
it was not mentioned in that agreement.
64United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949); Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 80
N.L.R.B. 478 (1948).
65Phelps Dodge Copper Prod. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952).
66Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950); cases cited note 64 supra.
67Phelps Dodge Copper Prod. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952).
6slnternational Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 245
(1949).
69Butler Chemical Co. 116 N.L.R.B. 1041, (1956), citing Taylor Forge & Pipe
Works, 113 N.L.R.B. 693 (1955), enforced, 234 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1956); see White's
Uvalde Mines, 117 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1957).
70The Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforced, 196 F.2d 680 (2d
Cir. 1952); see Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the
Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1097 (1950).
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The parties are not required to bargain on any subject other than
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment; but they may do
so if neither party insists, to the point of impasse, on the inclusion
in an agreement of a clause covering a nonmandatory subject as a
condition to agreement on mandatory matters. The Board and the
United States Supreme Court agree that such insistence is a refusal
to bargain about subjects within the scope of mandatory bargaining
even though the party has otherwise bargained in good faith as to
those subjects, irrespective of the motive for the insistence.7 1 If good
faith is based on the motive standard and if insistence on the inclusion of a nonmandatory subject is a violation regardless of motive,
it follows that such insistence is a violation even though the party
bargains in good faith. Thus there is an objective procedural rule
that nonmandatory subjects cannot be brought into the negotiating
process as the basis for a bargaining position.
Free collective bargaining includes bargaining for modification
or termination of an existing contract. Section 8 (d) of the act gives
specific objective procedures that must be followed in bargaining
over modification or termination. In addition to specific notices that
must be given, the contract by its terms must. be subject to termination
or reopening of the matter at issue; and there can be no strike, lockout, or other economic pressure in the negotiating process until both
the statutory and the contract requirements are met, irrespective of
how good or sincere the party's motives may be.72
In addition to putting more meat on the bones of the objective
requirements of the collective bargaining structure imposed by section
8 (d), the Board has been quite busy examining the negotiating process and its responsibility to this process through the good faith
concept. There are many cases under the Taft-Hartley Act that are
reminiscent of the Wagner Act good faith cases in that the primary
purpose of applying the good faith doctrine was to force employer
7'NLR.B v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). See
North Carolina Furniture, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (1958); Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV.
L. REv. 389 (1950); Findling & Colby, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the

NLRB -Another View, 51 COLuM. L. REv. 170 (1951). Note that it is not bad
faith or any other violation for an employer to use economic pressure to get a
union to bargain away participation in statutory subjects. Thus, although pressure
and insistence cannot be used to expand bargaining subjects, pressure can be used
to reduce them. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); White
v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (1958).
72Lion Oil Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 680 (1954), aff'd, 352 U.S. 282 (1957).
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recognition of the union as a joint participant in the determination of working conditions; and the Board still uses the concept as a
device for obtaining this objective, which is so essential to collective
bargaining.73 However, early in the 1950's the Board revealed its
opinion that its responsibility includes not only the forcing of recognition but also the regulation through the good faith concept of the

negotiating aspects of the bargaining procedure.

In this view the

concept applies to and controls, to the extent of the boundaries of good

faith, the negotiating conduct of both parties, including those who
have extended genuine recognition

and accepted the principle of

joint participation as well as those who have not.
The Board began to recognize the negotiating process as something separate and apart from other elements of bargaining, as an
entity, as a process or procedure that needed rules and regulations to
control it, and began to feel a responsibility for scrutinizing the negotiating tactics and imposing rules through the good faith concept with

the view of getting "good" bargaining procedures as opposed to a
73Examples are cases dealing with a unilateral change in working conditions
without prior consultation with the union, such as Tower Hosiery Mills, Inc., 81
N.L.R.B. 658 (1949) (general change in working conditions); General Motors Corp.,
81 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949) (institution of pension plan); Amory Garment Co., 80
N.L.R.B. 182 (1948) (wage increases); Bergen Point Iron Works, 79 N.L.R.B. 1073
(1948) (changes in work week). Notice the following language in Tower Hosiery
Mills, Inc., id at 662, that is typical of the use of the desire-to-reach-agreement
standard: "The respondent . . . went through many of the motions of collective
bargaining. It met on numerous occasions with the Union, conferred at length
regarding contract proposals, made concessions on minor issues, and discussed
and adjusted several grievances. These surface indicia of bargaining, however,
were nullified by the Respondent's manifest determination to deprive the Union
of any voice in determining such major issues as wage rates and working conditions. Such conduct on the part of the Respondent demonstrates that its
participation in discussions with the Union was not intended to lead to the consummation of an agreement with the Union, but merely to preserve the appearance of bargaining."
Other good faith cases under the Taft-Hartley Act that show a lack of
genuine recognition of the union are West Boylston Mfg. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 808
(1949) (dilatory and evasive tactics and unilateral determination of basis on
which laid-off employees are recalled); Franklin Hosiery Mills, Inc., 83 N.L.R.B.
276 (1949) (repudiation of oral agreements reached and shifting position on
matters under negotiation); Vanette Hosiery Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 1116 (1948) (refusal to submit complete counterproposal); Hillsboro Cotton Mills, 80 N.L.R.B.
1107 (1948) (refusal of employer to consider his own proposals as serious); Cookeville Shirt Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 667 (1948) (recognition of certified union as representative of union members only).
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simple sincere desire to reach agreement. Hence the situation occurs
wherein one tribunal, the Board, imposes the rules and regulations
for the procedures and processes of another tribunal, collective bargaining. These two tribunals have different parts to play, different
types of issues to resolve. There is no question that forcing genuine
recognition by each party of the other as a joint participant is a
responsibility of the Board, but perhaps this is as close as the Board
should come to the collective bargaining process.
The early 1950 cases reveal the awareness of the Board of the new
responsibility but not the finding of a new standard for good faith
other than the occasional play on the subtle difference between sincere
desire for agreement and sincere intent to reach agreement, and sometimes a move to the stronger sincere purpose or will to reach agreement. Notice the following holdings and supporting language from
the viewpoint of regulating a process as opposed to the primary purpose of forcing recognition.
"Mere participation in meetings with the Union and protestations of willingness to bargain do not alone fulfill the requirements of Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (d) of the Act, for these
are only the surface indicia of bargaining. Bargaining in good
faith is a duty on both sides to enter into discussions with
an open and fair mind and a sincere purpose to find a basis
for agreement touching wages and hours and conditions of
labor."74
The employer must explain shifts in bargaining position; otherwise
there may be an indication of a lack of "a sincere intention to reach
agreement." 75 The negotiator must be given sufficient authority to
bind the party represented,76 and if the negotiator displays a feeling
of personal animosity toward the opposing representative he must
be replaced. 7 There must be no insistence on a performance bond,78
and when a union has demonstrated a willingness to consider a
Saddlery Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1206 (1950).
75Atlanta Broadcasting Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 808 (1950). See also use of sincere
intent language in Harcourt and Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 892 (1952); L. L. Majure Transport Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 311 (1951).
7rStandard Generator Serv. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 790 (1950); Deena Artivare, Inc.,
86 N.L.R.B. 732 (1949); Ozark Dam Constr. Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 520 (1949).
77Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 728 (1950).
7SCases cited note 76 supra.
74Southern
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counterproposal the employer must make one covering at least current wages and working conditions; 79 and the counterproposal must
be definite and complete and capable of being understood. 80 Neither
party can object to the other party's use of his most experienced
negotiator. 81 Each party must furnish to the other party available
information that is requested on bargainable matters, 82 and each
party must permit the negotiating period in any one day to last for
a reasonable period of time.83 Neither party can insist on the
presence of a stenotypist, 84 and both are obligated to confine negotiations to disputed issues. 85 Customs in commercial contract negotiations or rules of contract law are not the standard for determining
8
whether bargaining in good faith has occurred. 6
New Standards
Unless some additional objective obligation apart from good faith
can be implied from the duty to bargain, the only authority by
which the Board may control the negotiating process is the good
faith concept. The Taft-Hartley Act does not prescribe the standards
that are applicable to the negotiating process other than good faith.
Obviously the nature and extent of the control depend on the standards of good faith adopted by the Board and the courts.
In 1952 the Board clearly showed signs of setting up standards
in addition to that of the sincere desire to reach agreement or even
the sincere purpose or intent to reach agreement.81 In this instance
the Board used the new standards, not as the basis of a finding that
79
Crow-Burlingame Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 997 (1951); Rex Mfg. Co., 86 N.L.R.B.
470 (1949).
8ODeena Artware, Inc., supra note 76; Dealers Engine Rebuilders, Inc., 95
N.L.R.B. 1009 (1951).
slIbid.
82Whitin Machine Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, enforced, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955); I. B. S. Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1951);
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 407 (1951), enforcement denied (on
ground no evidence of request for information), 196 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1952);

Leland-Gifford Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1951).
8

aGagnon Plating and Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 104 (1951).
84Reed and Prince Mfg. Co. 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951).
8
3Shannon and Simpson Casket Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 430 (1952).
S6Ibid.
S7Phelps Dodge Copper Prod. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952); see cases cited
note 64 supra.
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the union was guilty of an unfair labor practice but of a finding that
the union was guilty of wrongful conduct that excused the employer
for his refusal to continue negotiations. A slowdown during the
negotiating process is wrongful conduct for the reason that it fails
to meet the following standards which the Board suggests are imposed
by the good faith concept: each party (1) must do nothing that results in "an absence of fair dealing," (2) must not engage in a
"harassing tactic," (3) must engage in "honest and sincere dealing,"
(4) must maintain "reasoned discussion," and (5) must promote "a
background of balanced bargaining relations."'88 In addition, the
Board said that a party must not attempt by such harassing tactics
to dictate the terms of the contract. Perhaps an attempt to have one's
own way through some type of economic pressure is permissible. What
is fair dealing, a harassing tactic, a reasoned discussion, a background
of balanced bargaining relations? In whose eyes? What is fair negotiation in one relationship may not be fair in another. These
standards require a standard. Clearly these standards are a far cry
from a sincere desire for agreement. A sincere desire may induce a
party to engage in unfair dealing, including to the extent of his
economic power the use of harassing tactics and influential, although
unreasonable, discussion on the background of an unbalanced bargaining relationship.
The issue in NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works8 9 was whether an
employer engaged in bargaining must furnish to the union upon
request information as to the amount of wages received by each of
the employees represented by the union. The following language of
the Board setting a general standard for the duty to furnish information was quoted with approval by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit: 90
"'An examination of the wage information furnished by
the respondent shows that from such information the union
could not possibly determine what each individual employee
it represented was earning.
SSIbid.
8s217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955); see NLRB v.
New Britain Machine Co., 210 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Hekman Furniture Co., 207 F.2d 561 (4th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Leland-Gifford Co., 200 F.2d
620 (Ist Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Yawman and Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir.

1951).
90217 F,2d 593, 594 (4th Cir. 1954). (Emphasis added.)
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" 'We are convinced that the authority conferred by section
9 (a) of the Act upon a union representing a majority of the
employees in an appropriate unit entitles the union to all
wage information essential to the intelligent representation of
the employees and that when such information is reasonably
available only from the employer's records, it is the employer's
duty, on request, to accommodate the union. The courts have
consistently agreed with this construction of the statute. In
the instant case no showing has been made that compliance
with the union's request would have placed an unwarranted
and undue burden on the employer.
"'Refusal by an employer to supply such necessary information makes impossible the full development of the collective
bargaining negotiations which the statute is intended to
achieve. It therefore constitutes a violation of section
8 (a) (5) of the Act. This doctrine extends to a union's right
to request and to receive from the employer the names of the
employees in the appropriate unit together with their individual wage rates. Contrary to the suggestion of our dissenting
colleague, the union in this case sought the names of individuals coupled with their wage rates not only to achieve a
general wage increase but for the purposes of collective bargaining generally. In this respect, we agree with the statement
of our concurring colleague, that in these cases it is sufficient
that the information sought by the union is related to the
issues involved in collective bargaining, and that no specific
need as to a particular issue must be shown.'"
The court added:o1
"It is argued that the information furnished here was sufficient
for dealing with the existing controversy between the parties as
to a wage increase; but we agree with the Board that the union,
as bargaining agent of the employees, was entitled to information which would enable it to properly and understandingly
perform its duties as such in the general course of bargaining
and that such information should not necessarily be limited to
that which would be pertinent to a particular existing controversy."
91lbid. (Emphasis added.)
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Clearly the standard indicated by the above language of both the
Board and the court is broad enough to cover more than mere wage
data.
In NLRB v. The Item Company92 it was argued that the employer should not be required to furnish confidential wage data to
the union. The court enforced the Board order that the wage rate
and merit increase for each employee must be supplied, pointing out
that there was no showing that the requested information was conveniently and accurately available to the union through its membership, or that it was unduly burdensome for the employer to furnish
the information. In response to the employer's contention that he
owed a duty to the employees to keep their wages confidential, the
court quoted the observation of the United States Supreme Court
that to "allow employers to rely on employees' rights in refusing to
bargain with the formally designated union is not conducive to [industrial peace], it is inimical to it." 93
In another case 94 the union asked for wage information identifying
the employees receiving the various wage rates, and the Board ordered
that it be supplied. The employer resisted on the ground that disclosure of wages of individual employees would breach its duty to
the employees and might lead to pirating of employees by competitors. In addition to the interests of the individual employees and
the employer as motives for not supplying the information, the employer argued that the imposition of the duty in this case was unwarranted because the Board did not find that the information was
specifically relevant to pending negotiations, that is, that the needs
of bargaining required the information. The court enforced the
order, stating that the information requested was generally relevant
to the negotiations and specifically adopting the doctrine put forth
in NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works to the effect that individualized
wage data are presumptively relevant to collective agreement negotiations.95 The court also noted the utility of the doctrine in implementing the bargaining mandate of the act.
92220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1955).
93Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954).
94Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955).
95See cases cited note 89 supra. In Oregon Coast Operators Ass'n, 113 N.L.R.B.
1338 (1955), the union asked for employees' classifications and job functions, their
earnings, certain production and operational statistics, and types and specifications
of equipment used. The Board ordered the employer to furnish "relevant and
necessary" information. However, shortly thereafter, in Glen Raven Knitting Mills,
Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 422 (1956), the Board was careful to point out that the quali-
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The employer is in violation of section 8 (a) (5) of the act when
he refuses the union's request for time study information used in
setting the hourly and piece rates currently in effect for all production jobs in the plant, even though there was a recently executed
contract in effect at the time of the request and under its terms neither
the employer nor the union was entitled to call for renegotiation of
wage rates for another eight months. 96 The union insisted that it
needed the time studies and related data for purposes of contract
administration as well as collective bargaining. The court, in upholding the Board order, held that the employer was obligated to
make the information available, as it was manifestly relevant "to
the union's task as the bargaining representative," not only in assessing grievance claims and otherwise administering the contract
from day to day but also in preparing for the negotiations that might
be expected some months later. The court's response to the employer's argument that the duty to supply information is "pegged
to the existence of pending wage negotiations" or specific grievances
was that "collective bargaining is a continuing process .

. .

. The

Union not only has the duty to negotiate collective bargaining agreements but also the statutory obligation to police and administer the
existing agreements."

'9 7

In free collective bargaining the strong union by use of economic
pressure can get from the employer practically any data it wants,
including highly confidential matters that may be entirely irrelevant;
fication "and necessary" in the Oregon Coast case was not intended to overrule or
qualify the Whitin Machine Works doctrine but was added in the Oregon Coast
case because much of the requested information concerned issues other than
wages, the relevance of which was not readily apparent. In the Glen Raven case,
in which the employer asked for wage data and information on style construction
which was related to piece-rate pay, the Board issued a Whitin-type order, noting
that such data were generally related to collective bargaining and that it was
not necessary to show a specific need with reference to a particular issue. See
also Taylor Forge and Pipe Works, 113 N.L.R.B. 693 (1955), enforced, 234 F.2d
227 (7th Cir. 1956). The fact that the information may also be useful to the
union in collecting dues is immaterial. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc. v. NLRB,
229 F.2d 575, 576 (2d Cir. 1956). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and upheld the Board in forcing the production
of payroll information in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. NLRB, 235 F.2d 319, rev'd, 352
U.S. 938 (1956).
96J. I. Case Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 520 (1957), enforced, 253 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1958);
see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 352
U.S. 938 (1956).
97J.

I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d 149, 153 (7th Cir. 1958).
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whereas the weak union cannot get the most relevant information.
Now that law force has been made available, the weakest union can
get information needed for the negotiating process, just as it can
escort, through law force, the strongest employer to the bargaining
table against his will. Three developments in the duty to supply
information are noticeable. The first is the discovery that there is
such a duty. This occurred when the wage data cases came before
the Board.98 The values involved here are on one side the needs of
collective bargaining, involving the relevancy of the requested information to the issues being negotiated and the availability to the
union of the information. On the other side are aligned the interest
of the individual employee in having wages kept confidential, even
from his agent, the interest of the employer in not letting competitors who may pirate his employees have the wage information, and
the burden on the employer of supplying the information. The
second development is the extension of the periods of time when the
duty operates, beyond the mere period of negotiation to include
periods of time when negotiation is not in process, such as when
there is a contract presently operative. 99 The third development is
the extension of the duty to different types of information, beyond
mere wage data, that must be supplied. This was made law by the
Truitt Manufacturing case,1 00 wherein the Board held that an employer who uses financial inability as the reason for rejecting the
union's wage demand must substantiate the bargaining position by
offering reasonable proof of financial inability, perhaps even to the
extent of allowing the union accountant to examine his books and
statements. This case by law force compels an employer in the
negotiating process to supply proof of his bargaining position and
prescribes the extent of proof. There must be sufficient evidence for
the union to determine whether the position is an honest one, so that
it will be able to decide whether to persist in its demand or shift to
an alternative position. The Board later made it clear, however, that
this broad duty is applicable only when it is specifically relevant to
an issue under negotiation, saying that relevancy of requested information, without showing a specific need as to a particular issue, is
sufficient only in wage data cases.' 0' So if an employer rejects the
9sSee note 89 supra.
90See note 96 supra.
100110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954), enforcement denied, 224 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1955),
enforced, 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
tolPine Indus. Rel. Comm., Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1055 (1957). The Board noted
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demands on grounds other than financial inability he may keep his
books and financial records confidential. For instance, an employer
need not meet the union's request for annual production and sales
reports, since such information goes to financial status, which is
not in issue for the reason that the employer has not claimed inability
to pay. 10 2 But suppose that inability to pay is the employer's only
ground for refusing the union demand. Would not a false or pretended ground or no ground at all be the only alternatives, and would
not both of these alternatives be bad faith?
Although the Board finds its authority in section 8 (a) (5) of the
act in all of the above cases dealing with the duty to supply information, it is clear that the Board was thinking of something more than
the standard of sincere desire to reach agreement or even sincere
intent or purpose to reach agreement. And, although the Board and
the courts use such phrases as good faith bargaining, bargaining in
good faith, and good faith in bargaining when describing the duty
to supply information, much of the language tends to lead one to the
opinion that the Board views the duty to supply information relevant
to bargaining issues as an objective one, comparable to the duty to
meet and the duty to sign a contract previously agreed to. Indeed,
the Board has held that refusal to furnish individual employment
data (such as each employee's name, job classification, rate of pay,
seniority standing, paid holidays and vacations, total hours worked,
and total annual earnings) is a violation of section 8 (a) (5), even
though the refusal is not motivated by any intent to impede bargaining, for the reason that "a collective bargaining agent is entitled to
employment information pertaining to individual employees which
enables it properly to carry out its duties in the general course of
bargaining."'' 3 Obviously an employer could have a sincere desire
to reach agreement and not impede bargaining but at the same time
have good, honest motives for wanting to keep financial data confidential. Although it is not suggested that commercial bargaining
is comparable to labor bargaining, if the conception of good faith
in commercial law were like that imposed here, the failure of a businessman to prove his statements in bargaining would perhaps be
something like fraud.
When the Truitt case reached the United States Court of Appeals
that to hold otherwise would be in conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
1o2Pine Indus. Rel. Comm., Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1055 (1957).
03Id. at 1058.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1959], Art. 3
GOOD FAITH
for the Fourth Circuit, the court measured the case by the old good
and refused to
faith standard of sincere desire to reach agreement
10 4
enforce the order of the Board. The court said:
"And we do not think that merely because the company has
objected to a proposed wage rate on the ground that it cannot
afford to pay it, good faith bargaining requires it to open up
its books to the union in an effort to sustain the ground that
it has taken. If such were held to be the law, demand for examination of books could be used as a dub to force employers
to agree to an unjustified wage rate rather than disclose their
financial condition with such confidential matters as manufacturing costs, which could conceivably be used to their great
damage. To bargain in good faith does not mean that the
bargainer must substantiate by proof statements made by him in
the course of the bargaining. It means merely that he bargain
with a sincere desire to reach an agreement. There can be
no question but that the company here was bargaining in that
spirit."
The United States Supreme Court likewise considered that the case
was controlled by the good faith concept but by a divided court
reached a different result, enforcing the order of the Board. 0 5 The
Court did not show enthusiastic conviction. For instance, it noted
that a union is not automatically entitled to substantiating evidence
in every case in which economic inability is raised as an argument
against increased wages, but observed that in this case the parties
had treated the company's financial ability as highly relevant in
their effort to reach agreement, and concluded that a refusal of
financial data under these circumstances "may" support a finding of
failure to bargain in good faith. The Court said:206
"Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims
made by either bargainer should be honest claims. This is
true about an asserted inability to pay an increase in wages.
If such an argument is important enough to present in the
give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require
some sort of proof of its accuracy."
104224 F.2d 869, 874 (1955).
2O5NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
ioold, at 152.
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Some standard of good faith other than sincere desire to reach
agreement was used here. 10 7 After the Truitt case the Board continued to apply the standard, whatever it may be, forcing the employer to support his position of financial inability by evidence. The
Board said that without such information the union could not determine whether the employer's claim was honest, adding:0 8
"It could not intelligently decide whether to continue to press
for a wage increase or to make an alternative request. It was
forced to negotiate in the dark without regard to the economic
realities. It was not even able to make an informed report to
its own members as to the merits of their demands. It was
thus handicapped in carrying out its responsibility to inform
and advise the employees whom it represents."
Grievances pertaining to working conditions, such as seniority
and hiring policy, which are handled in a bargaining context and
which also are subject to the parties' contractual grievance and arbitration procedures, cannot in good faith be resolved by economic
force. 00 In other words, since a strike to resolve these issues is in
violation of an existing contract, the strike is unprotected activityl °
and bad faith, no matter how sincere the union may be in its desire
for agreement on the grievances. The Board has stated:""
"The Respondents by engaging in such unprotected activity
in aid of their bargaining position not only abused their bargaining powers and impaired the collective-bargaining process,
107Frankfurter, Clark, and Harlan, JJ., dissenting in part, id. at 154, believed
that the Board did not apply a proper standard in determining the employer's bad
faith, and that the case should be remanded to the Board.
108B. L. Montague Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 554, 557 (1956).
109nternational Union, UMW, Local 2935 (Boone County Coal Corp., Canawha
Coal Operators Ass'n), 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957).
"10See Textile Workers Union, CIO (Personal Prod. Corp.), 108 N.L.R.B. 743
(1954), discussed infra. This case was cited by the Board as supporting its decision
in the Boone County Coal Corp. case, supra note 109.
"'Ilnternational Union, UMW, supra note 109, at 1097. See note 64 supra for
cases revealing the same type of situation wherein a strike by a union in violation
of its contract constituted conduct wrongful enough to excuse the employer from
his duty to bargain with the union. See Phelps Dodge Copper Prod. Corp., 101
N.L.R.B. 360 (1952), for a case that reached the same result by finding that a
slowdown is wrongful conduct.
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but also thwarted the peaceful procedures for the channelizadon of contract disputes that they had agreed to follow as a
substitute for economic conflict. This, in our opinion, constituted bad-faith bargaining contravening the Act's requirements."
Here, then, is an objective standard, unconnected with motive or desire for agreement: good faith compels a party to use peaceful means
previously agreed to for resolving disputes.
In the foregoing cases dealing with good faith the primary question
was whether a particular issue involved in collective bargaining,
such as recognition, negotiating procedures, grievance determination,
furnishing information, and narrowing or expanding subjects for
bargaining, should be resolved by economic force or law force. The
primary function of the legal duty to bargain in good faith is to limit
the use of economic power. These cases manifest a further limitation
on the use of economic power, resulting from the expanding boundaries of good faith set by the Board. Next the Board turned its
good faith guns on the types of economic pressure used to resolve
issues that admittedly are legally subject to economic pressure. For
instance, a wage issue in new contract negotiations may be resolved
lawfully by economic pressure if the pressure selected meets the
standards of good faith. It should be remembered that other than
the very few pressures specifically designated by the act, such as the
secondary boycott, all economic pressures for the determination of
working conditions are legal under the act unless they run counter
to the good faith concept. It seems logical to say that the degree of
desire for agreement, perhaps including its sincerity, might be
measured in proportion to the severity of the economic pressure
exerted, including the most unpleasant types. In attempting to decide
what economic force will be outlawed, the cases may leave one rather
perplexed: can he find the standards used by the Board or is he left
to mere speculation from the outlawed pressures as to what the
standards are?
This new venture of the Board in the field of regulation of the
negotiating process is so unprecedented, the authority for it so tenuous, the potential consequences to industrial self-government so tremendous, that it is not inappropriate to describe the venture as dramatic. The Board made its move to regulate bargaining pressures by
the good faith concept in Textile Workers Union, CIO (Personal
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Prod. Corp.) .112 In an effort to induce the employer to agree to its

proposals in contract negotiations the union directed the employees
in the following pressure tactics: refusal to work overtime or special
hours, unauthorized extension of rest periods from ten to fifteen
minutes, slowdowns, unannounced walkouts, and the like. The
Board characterized these tactics as not a strike but "a series of unprotected harassing tactics" designed to "force the Employer's hand
in the then current negotiations," and stated that the congressional,
policy of settling industrial issues through the processes of conference
"is clearly neither furthered nor effectuated when an employer or a
union so exercises its bargaining powers as to thwart or impair the
bargaining process, which requires for its furtherance cooperating in
the give and take of personal conferences, with a willingness to let
ultimate decision follow a fair opportunity for presentation of opposing views, arguments, and positions."113

These unprotected tactics

"interfered with production and put strong economic pressure on the
Employer...." The Board found that "such unprotected harassing
tactics were an abuse of the Union's bargaining powers- 'irreconcilable with the Act's requirement of reasoned discussion in a background of balanced bargaining relations upon which good-faith
bargaining must rest'....

114

It pointed out that the act does not

prescribe an objective test of what constitutes good faith and quoted
the United States Supreme Court to the effect that good faith is a
question of fact to be decided in each case on the totality of the
relevant evidence.115 The Board indicated that in view of this totality
idea it has the authority to hold such harassing tactics bad faith,
although the Supreme Court has ruled that a state may regulate such
tactics for the reason that the "Board has no authority either to investigate, approve or forbid the union conduct in question."'116 The
Board insisted that this holding does not deny it authority to regulate
the tactics, since the Supreme Court was dealing with the issue of
the conflict between federal and state jurisdiction and was not con112108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954), enforcement denied, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
granted, 350 U.S. 1004, vacated and denied, 352 U.S. 864 (1956). See Phelps Dodge
Copper Prod. Corp., supra note 111, for an indirect move toward regulation of
types of economic pressures.
113108 N.L.R.B. at 745.
1141d. at 746. See Phelps Dodge Copper Prod. Corp., supra note 111, at 368,
in which the Board gave such a description of a slowdown.
ia5See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952).
l161nternational Union, UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd.,
336 U.S. 245, 254 (1949), rehearing denied, 336 U.S. 970 (1949).
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cerned with the question of what constitutes bad faith. It found that
through the use, in a negotiating context, of the tactics described
above the union was guilty of-bad faith, and it was ordered to cease
11 7
and desist from
"Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the Company, by engaging in slowdowns and unauthorized extensions
of rest periods; by engaging in walkouts or partial strikes for
portions of shifts or entire shifts; by inducing employees of
other concerns not to perform work for the Company; by refusing to work special hours or overtime; or by engaging in
any similar or related conduct ......
The Board did not attempt to side-step or cloud the issue. Before
both the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
and the United States Supreme Court it stated the issue as "whether
the union which directs such activity for the purpose of compelling
acceptance of its bargaining demands can properly be said to be discharging its statutory obligation to bargain collectively in good
faith." 118 The Board argued that there is a substantial and significant
difference between the partial strike used by the Textile Workers
Union and a total strike in so far as they bear on the duty to bargain in good faith. The Board said:. 19
"Unlike the cessation of both work and pay involved in a strike,
resort to harassing tactics like the ones in this case is designed
to enable the employees, during the bargaining negotiations,
unilaterally to dictate the terms of their employment and to accept compensation from their employer without giving him a
regular return of work done. The employer is faced with the
Hobson's choice of either discharging the employees and perhaps closing his plant, or operating under these very serious
handicaps or succumbing to the union's demands.
"Where a strike is called there are economic pressures on
both employer and the union to adjust and compose their
differences in a spirit of give and take. However, where the
union does not go out on strike but resorts to the tactics
217Textile Workers Union, CIO, Local 1172, 108 N.L.R.B. 743, 750 (1954).
2lsSee Brief for Petitioner, p. 12, NLRB v. Textile Workers Union, CIO, 350
U.S. 1004 (1956).
119d. at

12, 13.
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utilized here, it is in the felicitous position of 'having its cake
and eating it too.' The economic pressure is largely one-sided,
with little compulsion upon the union to reach an accord other
than upon its own terms."
The Board admits that total strike under the circumstances of this
case would be legal, as indeed it must under the clear mandate from
Congress, but holds that partial strike is not. The difference pointed
out is that in the former the employees do not get paid, whereas in
in the latter they do. In assessing the need for law regulation of
such tactics as the partial strike it should be remembered that the
employer is free to bring to bear on the union all of his economic
power, including the permanent discharge of the employees for engaging in the tactics, since the tactics are unprotected activity.12 0 So
the employer is free to discharge the employees; that is, he may accomplish the effect of the total strike and thus terminate any possible
obligation to pay wages.
The Court of Appeals concluded that resort to the tactics in this
case is no more incompatible with the statutory obligation to bargain
in good faith than resort to a total strike. The court applied the old
genuine desire for agreement standard of good faith, saying, "There
is not the slightest inconsistency between genuine desire to come to
agreement and use of economic pressure to get the kind of agreement
one wants.''121 The court indicated that the Board's theory that
such tactics are evidence that a union is not bargaining in good
faith will not stand analysis. The court set aside "so much of the
Board's order as rests upon supposed refusal to bargain in good
faith ...... 122 The United States Supreme Court first granted certiorari and later vacated and denied it.123 Perhaps certiorari was
vacated and denied for the reason that an argument was made to
the Court that the case was moot, since the Board on July 31, 1956,
certified another union as the representative of the employees.
The Board, uninfluenced by the reasoning of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, stuck to its position
12oPhelps Dodge Copper Prod. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952).
l2lTextile Workers Union, CIO, v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
Danaher, J., dissented, at 411. The court cited International Union, UAW v.
Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949), as authority for the conclusion that the Board had no power to prohibit the tactics involved in the case.
122227 F.2d at 411.
12aSee note 112 supra.
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when the same basic issue arose in late 1957 in Insurance Agents'
International Union, AFL-CIO (PrudentialIns. Co.).1 2 4 In handling
this case the trial examiner followed the views of the Court of Appeals,
but the Board refused to accept his findings and conclusions and
found the union guilty of bad faith according to its own views as
12 5
expressed in the Textile Workers Union case.
The facts were not in dispute. About two months before the
expiration date of the current contract the parties began negotiations
for a new agreement. The parties could not agree, and as the contract expiration date approached the union adopted a "Work Without Contract" program, admittedly designed to bring pressure on
the company to yield to its bargaining demands. 126 The district
agents refused to write new business, reported late to offices, sat in
offices without working, circulated petitions among policyholders, refused to attend special business conferences planned by the company,
and refused to make out required reports on new business. Each of
the activities was designed to curtail and disrupt business in order
to get the company's agreement on proposals, each perhaps provocative enough to excuse the throwing of epithets. No doubt each of
these actions, including the petitions if done on company time, was
sufficient ground for the discharge of every agent and other employee
who engaged in the activity.127 The issue was not whether the employer could fight back with his economic power - clearly he could but whether the Board could use law force against the tactics. The
Board described the activities as a concerted slowdown but insisted
that its decision did not amount to a finding that such activities are
unfair labor practices per se. It stated that it relied on the harassing
tactics solely as evidence of the union's bad faith dealings with tho
company, evidence that "reflected an attitude not to engage in the
free give-and-take of good-faith bargaining," thus unquestionably
pegging its decision to the good faith concept and eschewing objective
129
standards. 128 The Board said:
124119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957).

25See note 112 supra.
126After about three or four months of this pressure a new agreement was
reached, while the case was being processed before the Board; however, the Board
ruled that the reaching of a new agreement did not render the case moot and
denied the union's motion to dismiss. 119 N.L.R.B. at 769.
127119 N.L.R.B. at 771; see Phelps Dodge Copper Prod. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B.
360, 367-68 (1952).
128119 N.L.R.B. at 771. (Emphasis added.)
1291d. at 770. (Footnotes omitted.)
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"In our opinion, the harassing tactics to which the Respondent resorted while purporting to negotiate its differences
with the Company do not reflect the good-faith bargaining contemplated by the Act. Collective bargaining in good faith, as
the Board and the courts have so often held, pre-supposes that
both the employer and the union 'enter into discussion with
an open and fair mind, and a sincere purpose to find a basis
of agreement touching wages and hours and conditions of labor.'
It requires 'cooperation in the give and take of personal conferences with a willingness to let ultimate decision follow a
fair opportunity for the presentation of pertinent facts and
arguments.'
"In the present case, the Respondent's reliance upon harassing tactics during the course of negotiations for the avowed
purpose of compelling the Company to capitulate to its terms
is the antithesis of reasoned discussion it was duty-bound to
follow. Indeed, it clearly revealed an unwillingness to submit
its demands to the consideration of the bargaining table where
argument, persuasion, and the free interchange of views could
take place. In such circumstances, the fact that the Respondent
continued to confer with the Company and was desirous of
concluding an agreement does not alone establish that it fulfilled its obligation to bargain in good faith, as the Respondent
argues and the Trial Examiner believes."
The Board made no effort to distinguish this case from the Textile
Workers Union case, but in finding the union guilty of bad faith
130
openly admitted that it was disagreeing with the Court of Appeals
and deciding in accordance with its own opinion in that case. 13 1 A
petition to review was made to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, the same court that rendered the decision in the Textile Workers case, and late in 1958 this court by a
per curiam decision set aside the Board order, 132 citing its decision
in the Textile Workers Union case. On the Board's petition the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,133 and at this time,
ioId, at 772.

IbiSee note 112 supra.

il-Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
133NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 358 U.S. 944 (1959).
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November 1959, the case is in that Court pending decision. This
decision will be most important to industrial self-government.
A strike is illegal if its objective is illegal, for instance, the objective of a closed shop. The Board indicated in both the Textile
Workers Union and the Insurance Agents' International Union cases
that the objectives of the pressure tactics were legal and that had a
strike been used there could have been no objection. So, in the
Board's view, clearly the illegality flows exclusively from the means
used. The objective of better working conditions cannot justify these
means, although it may justify the strike; just as the objective of
more business and more profits may justify hurting a competitor by
advertising one's own product and cutting prices but not by stealing a
competitor's customers through fear of physical harm.13 4 But this is
for the consideration of tort law, which the Board does not apply.
It may be that Congress should make slowdowns and "harassing tactics" illegal per se, but the Board admits that it has not. L35 It may
be that harassing tactics are so injurious that they cannot be justified,
that there are other sufficient and better pressures to satisfy the needs
of collective bargaining, that the functions of these pressures can be
accomplished in less costly ways; 136 but it seems a bit startling to condude that Congress accomplished all this through the implications of
good faith. Undoubtedly the act does not prohibit all bad means,
unless this is achieved by the good faith concept. Probably violence,
as a means, is not illegal under the act. Congress was very careful
to select for outlawing only a very few specifically designated means,
such as some secondary boycotts and the jurisdictional strike. It may
be that Congress has the power to set up strict rules for the negotiating process, such as that there shall be no economic pressure during
bargaining other than the strike and that the strike shall be permissible only after the parties have sat at the table engaging in diligent bargaining for a certain number of days.13 7 But clearly Congress
has not done so.
3

4See note 7 supra.
'35See note 128 supra and accompanying text. Note that §501 (2) of the Labor
Management Relations Act provides that a strike includes "any concerted slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by employees."
236An example of encouraging the use' of less costly ways to accomplish the
same result is the Board's tendency away from the policy of ordering payment
of back wages in unfair labor practice strikes, for the purpose of encouraging the
use of Board procedure to correct unfair labor practices as opposed to the use
of the strike.
137Such power may be doubtful. Probably the validity of §§208-10 of the
1
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Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia seems
to hold to the old good faith standard of sincere desire for agreement,
whether the question is what issues may be resolved by economic
pressure or what type of economic pressure is permissible, 138 it has
been shown that courts of appeals of other circuits as well as the
Supreme Court' 39 have gone along with the Board in setting up some
new standards. In order to give emphasis with perspective to the
direction that the Board has taken it may be helpful to summarize,
with brief comment, the standards that appear to have been used.
In order to devise a satisfactory standard the purpose and objective
of the legal concept must be known. Since the early cases agreed
that recognition was the objective of the good faith concept, these
cases fashioned a workable standard, namely, conduct naturally flowing from genuine recognition of labor as a joint participant in determining working conditions and from the genuine desire to reach
4
agreement with labor on terms that control working conditions.10
This standard was well received for the reason that it was compatible
with the law-enforced rights under the current labor policy of collective bargaining. Other expressions of the same standard or parts
thereof are sincere desire or intent to find a basis for agreement
and sincere purpose or will to reach agreement.'41 Perhaps
reasoned discussion and sincere dealing 42 in the context of these
cases form a part of this standard, but there is more doubt about
fair dealing and honest dealing to the extent that these phrases may
suggest an impropriety in taking a tough bargaining position or may
import helpful dealing amounting to concessions or approaching concessions or something less than arm-length negotiating.143 An open
and fair mind44 suggests a judge or arbitrator, hardly a negotiator, at
Labor-Management Relations Act, providing for the 80-day injunction, depends
upon the existence of a national emergency. See United Steelworkers v. United
States, 80 Sup. Ct. 1 (1959).
13sSee notes 121, 132 supra.
139Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954), enforcement denied, 224 F.2d 869
(4th Cir. 1955), enforced, 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
l4OSee notes 27-45 supra.
'411bid.
142See Southern Saddlery Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1950).
143See notes 75-85 supra.
144See Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939); Southern
Saddlery Co., supra note 142. In both cases the same standard was used, but notice
what may be a different objective in a somewhat different context. In other words,
take the standard out of the recognition context and the objective becomes some-
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least to the extent that it imports co-operation and impartiality.
Should a negotiator be compelled by law to be impartial? He represents a principal whose interests conflict with those of the opposite
party.
Willingness to reveal information needed by the opposite party
in order to perform properly and understandingly the duties of agent
in the general course of bargaining4s includes the duty to supply information relevant to bargaining issues, 148 both during negotiation
proceedings and in preparation therefor,147 and the duty to prove or
substantiate the bargaining position.148 This standard forces recognition of the peculiar aspects of collective bargaining. Refusal to
prove or substantiate a position may leave the opposite party in the
dark as to whether he should persist in his proposal or switch to an
alternative.149 Thus the standard of honest claimsso may require
proof, since neither party can quit and go home if he becomes dissatisfied with the opposite party's unsubstantiated position or claim,
as he can in commercial bargaining. Labor and management must
deal with each other by force of economics as well as law; they cannot quit. Would it not, then, be more appropriate to say that substantiating positions and supplying information are requisites because of the needs of collective bargaining in the same sense that
pleadings are requisites because of the needs of a court trial, and
that such duties have nothing to do with a party's good faith?151 If
so, would it not be more appropriate for Congress to do the saying?
The policy question is difficult and most important to industrial selfgovernment. The peculiar aspects of collective bargaining form the
basis of the primary arguments for making the duties requisites per
se as well as for the position of the Board and courts that they are

thing else. This result may occur unconsciously by focusing attention on the
standard separate and apart from its objective.
'4sSee NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954); Pine
Indus. Rel. Comm., Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1058 (1957).
Z46See note 95 supra.
147See note 96 supra.
l4sSee Truitt Mfg. Co., note 152 infra.
249B. L. Montague Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 554 (1956).
",o9bid.
151 1n Pine Indus. Rel. Comm., Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1055 (1957), the Board
seemed to be close to this position when it said that a refusal to supply information is an unfair labor practice even though the refusal was not motivated by any
intent to impede bargaining.
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part of the good faith concept, 152 but the dangers to industrial selfgovernment may more than outweigh these arguments. It should be
emphasized that economic pressure is the bulwark of collective bargaining. It cannot be supplanted by law force without turning collective bargaining into a law tribunal. Man has not yet progressed
to the point where both economic pressure and law force can be
replaced by a good heart when issues in a conflict of interest context
are to be resolved. And to think that law-enforced good faith is
a good heart is a delusion. Unquestionably the duties to reveal confidential information and to prove claims put law in a position where
it cannot avoid influencing decisions on wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. The occasion can easily arise on which an
employer will agree to a union proposal on working conditions solely
for the purpose of keeping confidential financial information out of
the hands of his competitors. This can happen to an employer who
genuinely recognizes the union as a joint participant in determining
working conditions, who sincerely desires to reach agreement, who
diligently and purposefully works with a will to find a basis for
agreement, and yet, but for this law force of the Truitt Manufacturing
Co. case, 153 would not agree to the union proposal because of a firm
belief that the proposal is not good for the employer, the employees,
or the business.
Tactics designed to force the opposite party's agreement to proposals is bad faith.154 An ordinary strike would not meet this standard. The negotiating motive is to get an agreement favorable to the
party represented. Is this not the expected and approved motive in
collective bargaining? Undoubtedly this standard is moving toward
co-operation between the parties as opposed to competition and has
l52Truitt Mfg. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954), enforcement denied, 224 F.2d 869

(4th Cir. 1955), enforced, 351 U.S. 149 (1956). One may conclude from this case
that the Board has taken the position or at least has shown signs of wanting to
take the position that supplying needed information and substantiating claims
are objective requirements separate from good faith, but that the Supreme Court
refused to recognize this move and insisted on applying the good faith concept.
See Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L.
153NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).

REV.

1401, 1432 (1958).

154See note 113 supra and accompanying text. Since an ordinary strike would
not meet the standard, perhaps the Board means to qualify the standard by
these tactics with this objective. However, perhaps the standard is intended, since
the Board seems to place an emphasis on the objective of forcing the opposite
party's hand and leaves a feeling that good faith requires both parties to leave
some period for negotiating free from all economic pressure.
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nothing to do with the subjective desire for agreement through negotiation. But if co-operation should be imposed, is that not the function of Congress? Co-operation is a rather hard objective for law
force to achieve. It is in about the same category as love your neighbor and do not discriminate because of race or religion. Go-operation
may be the goal of a negotiating process struggling to perfect itself,
but its achievement is for evolution and the developing pressures of
society, if industrial self-government is to survive. Such pressures beyond law can be very potent; for instance, note the large number
of corporations that are developing an awareness of their responsibility to society, as demonstrated by their growing financial support
of education and other things vital to society. Labor and management
cannot escape the pressure of the consciousness of responsibility to
society.
Willingness to give presentment of facts and argument an opportunity to produce decisions 55 means that neither party can attempt
by economic pressure to force decisions, at least until decisions have
had an opportunity to flow from peaceful debate. Both parties must
have an open and fair mind and co-operate in permitting uncoerced
debate; otherwise the negotiating process will be thwarted or impaired,
and in the opinion of the Board it has the duty to prevent this. If
decisions fail to flow from reasonable debate, may the floodgate of
economic pressure then be opened? This standard goes beyond even
the regulation of types of pressure; it says that there shall be no
pressure until after a reasonable period of bargaining. There must
be reasonable debate without economic pressure or, as the Board has
expressed it on several occasions, reasoned discussion in a background
of balanced bargaining relations.156 It may be that this means the
appearance only of balanced bargaining relations during reasonable
debate, that is, during a period of time reasonable under the circumstances for the presentment of facts and arguments the parties must
appear and act as equals with no economic pressure or perhaps even
the threat of it. Surely the law does not propose actually to balance
bargaining relations and make a weak union strong or a strong employer weak. On the other hand, it does seem that the law is saying
that if one of the parties is strong he cannot use that strength even
to resolve issues pertaining to working conditions, such as wages, at
least during the required period of uncoerced and reasonable debate.57
155See notes 113, 129 supra and accompanying text.
256See notes 87, 114, 129 supra and accompanying text.

157There is no question that legislation has prevented the employer from
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One who uses his economic strength at times during negotiations
"when he should not" or brings it into play by "undesirable" tactics
is guilty of abuse of bargaining power15s and therefore of bad faith.
This standard may be used in an effort to relate certain tactics to
a state of mind, to give the appearance that the regulations fall within
the good faith concept; really perhaps it is a bit of self-deception such
as may be accomplished by the use of epithets, like calling oleomargarine an "adulterated food" or referring to the 1956 Hungarian
revolutionaries as "hooligans."
It is hard to see how strong economic pressure'5 9 can be intended
as a standard of good faith; surely it is not the strength or weakness
of the pressure. Probably the purpose of this expression is to characterize certain tactics as tainted with some kind of "badness," although
the tactics are motivated by a sincere desire for agreement. Unquestionably the standard of unprotected activity60 goes directly to the
types of economic pressure that may not be used irrespective of motive. The case opinions give the impression that all unprotected
activities are "harassing tactics" which are bad faith or at least evidence bad faith. One is reluctant to say that the Board goes this far,
and prefers to feel that setting up the expression as a standard is to
use it out of the context of the case. But if it does go this far the
good faith concept becomes a fountainhead of power for the Board;
it means that all the multitude of unprotected economic practices
previously considered free from restraint by the act, except those
expressly mentioned therein, fall before the broad sweep of the good
faith concept.
It seems appropriate to suggest that the Board is using only one
standard, namely, the Board's idea of good bargaining procedures,
perhaps even ideal bargaining procedures. The Board is shooting
for a goal that on the surface appeals to all men's hearts. Can industrial self-government survive good faith? Was this result intended
by Congress?

using his economic strength to oppose unionization. But notice that (1) this was
done by the clear expression of the congressional will and not by implication from
a vague concept, and (2) the issues involved in the cases using the standards discussed are terms of working conditions (assuming the acceptance of the principles
of collective bargaining, such as recognition), the only area left for industrial
self-government.
15sSee notes 112, 124 supra and accompanying text.
159See

note 112 supra and accompanying text.

160See notes 112, 113, 118 supra and accompanying text.
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Tim ImPACT OF THE GOOD FAITH CONCEPT ON INDUSTRIAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT

Good faith as a legal duty flows from society's interest in industrial peace. There are many examples of society's move toward peace
in industrial relations that result in the change from free collective
bargaining to controlled collective bargaining. Clear statutory policy
shows moves from voluntary bargaining to compulsory bargaining;
from bargaining by minority or majority agent to bargaining only by
agent representing a majority of employees; from bargaining about
any subject to the elimination of some subjects, such as recognition
and the closed shop; from freedom regarding bargaining procedure
to regulation of procedure, such as the duty to give notice of intent
to modify or terminate an existing contract; from free use of economic
pressure to the elimination of certain types of economic pressure,
such as the secondary boycott; and from any kind of bargaining
attitude to good faith bargaining.
The labor area of the economy is so highly specialized and complex, and its institutions through which law attempts to gain society's
goals are so delicate that instead of leaving the application of law
entirely to the courts Congress set up a special expert agency with
the primary purpose of promoting industrial peace and industrial
self-government through collective bargaining. One of the Board's
main duties is to protect and nourish the institution of collective
bargaining. It has seen this duty as requiring it to bring about order
through law in the negotiating process. It is so natural to seek order
and certainty through the sovereign that the unnatural cry of freedom
must be sounded perhaps more here than other areas of the sovereign's
operations, because not only is collective bargaining a delicate institution of society but its life depends on freedom.161 Congress has
recognized the need for freedom. The objectives relating to industrial peace set out in section 1 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act are congressional hopes, not requirements. The Board's basic
problem is the same as that of general government, namely, how to
combine order and freedom.
In a self-government context the forces playing on the subjective
elements of collective bargaining must flow from the parties themselves, from the force of their arguments and from the force of their
2611t is no more inconsistent to say that parties have freedom to determine
industrial issues, although economic pressures force agreement, than it is to
say that freedom exists in the United States, although economic necessity forces
men to work.
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economic power. Psychology is so much a part of the negotiating process; motive, intermediate and ultimate, position and flexibility of
position, all are important ingredients. In negotiating, a position may
be taken for intermediate purposes only. Who can determine with
reasonable certainty what bargaining motive is behind a particular
proposal? Law cannot reach a man's mind; it cannot open it or change
it. All it can do is force that conduct which law's agent thinks should
flow from the mental attitude decreed, such as good faith. In a certain
industry ninety per cent of the labor-management contracts contain
a clause providing for an hour lunch period. Suppose an employer
in this industry refuses to agree to this clause, insisting on a forty-five
minute lunch period. Is it likely that government would consider
his position arbitrary and therefore bad faith, even though his
motive is the desire to step up production? If so, law force would
determine or highly influence the determination of this issue on
working conditions. The Board holds to the theory that it is bad
faith for a party to insist on a term covering a nonmandatory subject
as a condition for agreeing to a term covering a mandatory subject.
The idea is that the party would - or is it should? - agree on the
mandatory subject term notwithstanding a lack of agreement on the
nonmandatory subject. This idea is not necessarily true. Many
nonmandatory subjects may affect mandatory subjects; so agreement
on nonmandatory items may be a legitimate road to agreement on
mandatory items. Willingness to accept a proposed solution of a
dispute involving mandatory subjects on the condition that there is
agreement on a proposed solution of a dispute involving nonmandatory subjects is not the same as an arbitrary refusal to agree to terms
on the mandatory subject. In the Board's view a refusal to agree on
a wage proposal unless vacation periods are changed, both clearly
mandatory subjects, may be bad faith. Obviously it passes judgment
on the reasonableness of the positions of parties on proposed terms.
A party must explain a shift in his bargaining position. How can
the negotiator know what explanation will satisfy the Board? He
must keep his mind on building a record for Board scrutiny, wondering whether he can explain a contemplated shift, instead of devoting
himself exclusively to getting an agreement. When the Board tells the
parties to make firm offers only, to prove that positions taken are
honest and reasonable, to demonstrate a present intention of finding
a basis for agreement, to explore the subject with an eye to compromise, is it not in effect demanding concessions in that it demands
things that force concessions? The Board's power, through good faith,
to judge the arbitrariness of negotiating proposals and to outlaw
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"bad" pressures, thus mixing law force with economic force in the
negotiating process and inevitably affecting the economic power of
one party over the other, influences the determination of terms that
control working conditions. But perhaps the most injurious effect
of all the areas of the impact of good faith on industrial self-government is that they narrow the range of the negotiating process. Wide
range with regard to flexibility of position and to maneuverability
of parties as to subject matter, procedures, and pressures is quite
necessary to the successful operation of the bargaining process. To
put a straightjacket on negotiators by good faith or otherwise is to
reduce the potential of collective bargaining.
Mr. Boyd Leedom, Chairman of the National Labor Relations
Board, delivered an address to The Florida Bar on May 23, 1959, in
which he made a plea to the negotiators of labor and management for
a change from a dog-eat-dog attitude to teamwork. A change to
teamwork is rather hard, since the negotiators are not working on
the same team. They are competitors in accordance with one of the
basic principles of our economic system. To be a team two or more
must work toward a common objective -a football team, to score;
two horses, to move a wagon in one direction. Labor and management appear not to have a common objective. Therefore, does not
Mr. Leedom ask the impossible? Yes, unless a common objective is
found and brought firmly to the consciousness of negotiators. It can
and must be found if industrial self-government is to be maintained.
If co-operation through a common basic goal cannot be accomplished
the alternative is that law will move in and force the results by law
sanction, with the consequent death of industrial self-government.
Society wants efficient production and happy workers. The view
that law force in lieu of the negotiating process can better meet these
desires is an illusion. The productive machine is impersonal and
big, and the labor part of it is impersonal and big. Personal pride
of the employee in the work he accomplishes as a motivation may in
most instances at present be unattainable, and it is true that the
employer's power to fire employees who engage in unprotected obstructive tactics is no answer to his problem of getting efficient operation and production. But it is highly doubtful that legal injunctions
or orders can achieve efficient production as effectively as economic
pressures in conjunction with mature collective bargaining. How effective would it be for a court to issue to workers an injunction to "produce efficiently"? What law or government agency can give an employee the satisfaction of enjoying his job? What law or government
agency can give management the production of a happy employee
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with pride in his work?
The moving forces of society gradually are requiring the ascension
of co-operation and a comparative down-grading of competition. This
is good from the point of view of labor problems, on the assumed
premise that a highly industrialized society is desirable. Co-operation
is just another product of such a society, along with uniformity and
conformity. Bertrand Russell has expressed the opinion that two
nations are more likely to achieve economic prosperity through cooperation than competition, but that competition continues because
people cannot develop their emotions at the same rate as their skills.
He has indicated the need among all people for integration of purpose for the reason that in a technically developed world what is done
in one region may have enormous effects in a quite different region
and as long as people, in their emotions, take account only of their
own region, society as a whole fails to work smoothly. He compares
the world to the human body where all cells, except cancerous ones
which ultimately kill the body as well as themselves, work cooperatively toward the common ends of the body as a whole.
It is not suggested that co-operation will solve all labor problems.
It brings dangers to the worker and to management just as conformity
and uniformity do. However, it may go far toward meeting society's
need for industrial peace and self-government. Law force cannot.
It is reported that a co-operative view of the industrial machine
works well in solving labor problems at Weirton Steel, where there
has been no major labor trouble for twenty-five years and no strike
since 1933. Irrespective of the "one worldness" of Bertrand Russell's
idea, some such view of the American production machine may have
to be taken by management and labor in order to avoid further
encroachment by government. To do this, growth of emotions is
necessary. Law force cannot make emotions grow in the labor field
any more than it can in such problem areas as religious discrimination. This takes evolution - time. The attempt to force co-operation
in the tradition of the Truitt, Textile Workers, and Insurance Agents
cases threatens to supplant co-operation and its potential development
by law force. The values involved are worth the risk of waiting for
evolution.
Man by his nature often tends to sacrifice freedom for certainty.
A taste of what seems to be certainty through law sometimes acts as
a narcotic. The desire may blind even the parties immediately involved to the dangers of control. The progression toward control is
so instinctively human that a fight to slow the movement may give
the psychological reaction of a fight against nature. The end of the
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move to law control is not in sight. Although the 1959 steel strike
primarily points up the industry-wide bargaining problem rather
than the failure of collective bargaining, this strike has given new
impetus to the move to control the negotiating process, and it is
unlikely now that government will wait much longer for the development of co-operation in collective bargaining. One writer has seen
the possibility that government, with all its power and influence, will
become the third party at the bargaining table. 62 He refers to this
as tripartite bargaining. The Secretary of Labor is in favor of bringing
more pressure on negotiators through government. Recent newspaper reports indicate that certain senators favor the substitution of
compulsory arbitration or a federal labor court for collective bargaining, at least in some industries, after an impasse has existed for a
certain number of days.
Just what is possible for law force to accomplish in the evolutionary development of the negotiating process to the co-operation
level? Society may be demanding ideal bargaining conditions or
ideal bargaining practices, but certainly in its present temper it is
demanding successful bargaining practices .

63

Can there be successful

practices imposed by law without destroying industrial self-government? The answer must be "no" if the test of success is complete industrial peace, perhaps "yes" if the more modest goal of practices that
increase the prospects of agreement is acceptable. Regulation of the
negotiating process that is designed to improve it must have a workable standard. Where can it be found-in someone's idea of a
standardized fictional man of good faith, the standards of ethics of
some profession, the standards of fair play between business men?
Surely not. What is fair dealing or negotiating in one relationship
may not be fair in another. So the standard must be the practices
worked out over the years by management and labor and accepted
by them.16 4 This is just as objective as the prudent man standard, and
it is no more subjective than the test applicable to the physician who
has a will and a desire to cure the patient but is too incompetent to
follow customary procedures.
The United States Supreme Court has said that collective bargaining means the "philosophy of bargaining as worked out in the labor
l62Sussna, Is Tripartite Bargaining Inevitable?, 10 LAB. L. 301 (1959).
loaProbably the negotiating process is not the best place to attack labor problems that are considered no longer private between private parties for the reason
that these problems have such a large impact on society, such as the 1959 steel
strike.
164See Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAv. L. REv. 1401, 1435-37
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movement in the United States."' 1 65 Mr. Justice Frankfurter has pro-

posed reasonableness as the standard for determining whether insistence on a particular subject is bad faith. 6 Reasonable in the light
of past practices? Perhaps he would apply the same test to conduct
and pressures; for instance, conduct clearly outside the reasonable
range of industrial pressure is bad faith. Perhaps something like the
suggested standard of practices worked out by the parties over the
years is what the Board had in mind when it said "conduct which
is inconsistent with the concept of collective bargaining" is evidence
of bad faith.167 Of course the Board may mean its own conception
as opposed to that worked out by the parties. This conclusion is
borne out by Board language that suggests a Utopian vision of successful collective bargaining without economic pressure, bargaining
by words alone.168 There is little doubt that the Board is willing to
push the parties toward "better" practices. It may be that industrial
freedom is not needed if government is wise enough to make better
decisions than the parties themselves. Better for whom- labor and
management, society, government, or all three? So one is led back
to the basic problem of how to determine what is better. What is
better for one objective may not be better for another. Admittedly
all that is accomplished by the suggested standard is to bring by
law force all labor negotiations up to the minimum performances
worked out by the parties and customarily acceptable to them, in
the same fashion that standards imposed on dentists do not require
ideal dental practices. Measured by the recent trend of good faith
cases, this might result in substantial improvement. Measured by the
present clamor for industrial peace, it may not seem to be much.
However, probably it is all that can be achieved from the regulation
of the negotiating process unless society is willing to move dangerously
away from industrial self-government.
(1958).
16Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
346 (1944), quoted with approval in NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395,
408 (1952). Of course the Court meant other than clearly changed by statute,
such as voluntary bargaining changed to compulsory.
166 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 351 (6th Cir.
1953); see Feinsinger, The National Labor Relations Act and Collective Bargaining,

57 MICH. L. RKv. 807, 832 (1959).
16720 NLRB ANN. REP. 98 (1955).
16STextile Workers Union, CIO, 108 N.L.R.B. 743, 745-47 (1954). The quarrel
is with the thought that law force can supplant economic pressure without
mortally wounding collective bargaining. Bargaining without pressures through
voluntary co-operation will not carry the same dangers to self-government.
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